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Abstract: 
Central banks have recently introduced new policy initiatives, including a policy called 
‘Quantitative Easing’ (QE). Since it has been argued by the Bank of England that “Standard 
economic models are of limited use in these unusual circumstances, and the empirical 
evidence is extremely limited” (Bank of England, 2009b), we have taken an entirely empirical 
approach and have focused on the QE-experience, on which substantial data is available, 
namely that of Japan (2001-2006). Recent literature on the effectiveness of QE has neglected 
any reference to final policy goals. In this paper, we adopt the view that ultimately 
effectiveness will be measured by whether it will be able to “boost spending” (Bank of 
England, 2009b) and “will ultimately be judged by their impact on the wider macroeconomy” 
(Bank of England, 2010). In line with a widely held view among leading macroeconomists 
from various persuasions, while attempting to stay agnostic and open-minded on the 
distribution of demand changes between real output and inflation, we have thus identified 
nominal GDP growth as the key final policy goal of monetary policy. The empirical research 
finds that the policy conducted by the Bank of Japan between 2001 and 2006 makes little 
empirical difference while an alternative policy targeting credit creation (the original 
definition of QE) would likely have been more successful. 
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1   Introduction 
Central banks have recently introduced new policy initiatives, including a policy 
called ‘Quantitative Easing’ (QE). This has renewed interest in the question of the 
effectiveness of different approaches to monetary policy conduct and implementation. 
Since it can be argued that “Standard economic models are of limited use in these 
unusual circumstances, and the empirical evidence is extremely limited” (Bank of 
England, 2009b), more empirical evidence on the effectiveness of QE would seem 
desirable. In this paper we focus on the QE-experience that has delivered a substantial 
set of time series data, namely that of Japan (2001-2006), which could also be put into 
the context of the even longer time period of post-banking crisis economic 
underperformance (since about 1993).   
 
Measurement of Central Bank Performance 
The performance of monetary policy can be measured in terms of processes (‘process-
based performance’, which we choose to christen ‘input performance’) or relevant 
final economic outcomes (‘result performance’, ‘outcome performance’ or, our 
preferred term, ‘output performance’). The literature on central bank performance 
measurement can accordingly be divided into these two categories.   
 
The first chooses an ‘output performance’ measure that focuses on whether a final 
target variable, such as price stability or growth performance (and sometimes also 
currency stability) has been achieved (Parking and Bade, 1980, Emerson et al., 1992, 
Cukierman et al., 1992, Alesina and Summers, 1993, Hasan and Mester, 2008). This 
has a major drawback: By not engaging in an analysis of the details of monetary 
transmission, we learn little about the suitability of particular monetary policy Effectiveness of Quantitative Easing in Japan 
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instruments, intermediary targets or approaches (i.e. by leaving ‘input performance’ 
up to the central bank).     
 
The second branch of literature focuses on the effectiveness of specific operational 
procedures in affecting operational targets (see, e.g. Hamilton, 1996; Bartolini and 
Prati, 2006; Nautz and Schmidt, 2009). The literature on the role of the bank lending 
channel (BLC) in the transmission of monetary policy often also belongs to this 
category, as it argues that the effectiveness of monetary policy is contingent on its 
impact on bank behavior (see, for instance, Bernanke and Gertler, 1995; Kishan and 
Opiela, 2006). Thanks to the Japanese experience beginning in 1991, of low interest 
rates and low inflation or deflation, a new literature has developed which focuses on 
the effectiveness of specific monetary policy instruments, tools or intermediate targets 
under such circumstances of extremely low interest rates.   
 
In principle, the renewed interest in ‘input performance’ is a welcome development. 
However, the literature has gone to the other extreme and in recent years virtually 
ignored ‘output performance’ measurements.   
 
The literature analysing the effectiveness of Japanese monetary policy since 1991; i.e. 
monetary policy under conditions of extremely low interest (‘zero interest’) and/or the 
specific monetary policy instrument called ‘quantitative easing’ (QE), has defined the 
‘effectiveness’ of such monetary policy not in terms of a final economic outcome, 
such as a sustainable economic recovery with steady nominal GDP growth of 2.5%. 
Instead, the criterion for performance measurement is process-based ‘input   4
performance’; namely, whether such policy had an impact on interest rates, another 
intermediate target.2 At the same time, the empirical research fails to present 
evidence that interest rates are a reliable proxy for any relevant output performance 
goal.  
 
There is thus a gap in the literature concerning empirical work on the effectiveness of 
monetary policy tools and instruments (i.e. input performance; engaging with details 
of the transmission mechanism) that relates performance measurement to a final target 
variable (output performance). While this is already implemented in studies on the 
effectiveness of central bank FX intervention, including in Japan (e.g. Kim and Sheen, 
2006; Beine et al., 2009), it has not been applied to overall monetary policy. This 
paper aims to fill this gap by examining the performance of actual and potential 
monetary policy instruments and intermediate targets in explaining a final policy 
target variable, and conducting a ‘horse race’ test between them. The empirical data 
are from Japan, where extremely low interest rates have existed for the longest time 
period and where a policy called ‘quantitative easing’ was first introduced.   
 
In this paper, we concur with the view that ultimately monetary policy effectiveness 
will be measured by whether it will be able to “boost spending” (Bank of England, 
2009b) and “The effectiveness of the MPC’s asset purchases will ultimately be judged 
by their impact on the wider macroeconomy” (Bank of England, 2010). In line with a 
widely held view among leading macroeconomists from various persuasions, while 
attempting to stay open-minded concerning the distribution of demand changes 
                                                           
2  In the context of the earlier literature on central bank independence and inflation performance, this is 
tantamount to arguing that independent central banks are better able to influence interest rates, while any Effectiveness of Quantitative Easing in Japan 
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between real output and inflation, we are assuming that nominal GDP growth is the 
key final policy goal of monetary policy.   
 
Thus the effectiveness of Japanese monetary policy is re-examined, using a 
methodology that differs from other papers and is thought to be more suitable for the 
task. Based on the results, meaningful conclusions can be made concerning the actual 
performance of the central bank’s policies, as well as for other countries that have 
since adopted similar policies.   
 
The Relevance of Japan 
The Japanese experience is relevant for a number of reasons: like the US and the UK, 
Japan’s economy experienced significant asset price rises, followed by a major 
banking and financial crisis. The central bank adopted dramatic measures, by 
reducing interest rates from about 8% in 1991, to 0.001% a decade later, and by 
boosting bank reserves significantly. It is also the first country in which a central bank 
introduced a policy that was officially termed ‘quantitative easing’ (henceforth ‘QE’). 
The Bank of England adopted a policy with this name in March 2009.3  
2    The Literature on Quantitative Easing in Japan 
The conduct of monetary policy when interest rates approach zero has attracted 
significant attention by economists. Theoretical work, inspired by the Japanese 
                                                                                                                                           
potential or actual link with inflation is left for the reader to work out. 
3  Finally, and somewhat ominously, Japan’s central bank has not been obviously successful in achieving 
basic aims of monetary policy, such as price stability (Japan holds the world record for deflation in the   6
experience, asks whether a shift to the quantity of money as an operational tool could 
substitute for lacking manoeuvrability of interest rates. Most authors propose a 
theoretical general equilibrium model with rational expectations, including Krugman 
(1998), Fujiki et al. (2001), Woodford (2003), Svensson (2003), Eggertsson and 
Woodford (2003) and Benhabib et al. (2003). This literature tends to share the 
assumptions of complete and efficient financial markets, whereby no agents face any 
constraints on their ability to borrow against future income. Instead of featuring a 
mechanistic monetary transmission mechanism, the models rely on the role of 
(unobservable) expectations and their impact on interest rates, which are assumed to 
be the main component of monetary transmission.   
 
As a result, the ‘effectiveness’ of QE is defined by its effectiveness in moving interest 
rates (whether only short-term rates, as for instance in Krugman, 1998, or “the entire 
expected future path of short-term real rates, or very long term real rates” in 
Eggertsson and Woodford, 2003). The theoretical papers conclude that QE must be 
ineffective when adopted under conditions of a zero interest rate policy, because it 
does not affect the general equilibrium level of interest. Since that is the only way to 
stimulate the economy in such models, the policy will be ineffective. In the words of 
Eggertsson and Woodford (2003): “’quantitative easing’ that implies no change in 
interest-rate policy should neither stimulate real activity nor halt deflation; and this is 
equally true regardless of the kind of assets purchased by the central bank.” This is 
also the conclusion of Fujiki et al. (2001), employees of the BoJ, who published their 
paper denying the effectiveness of QE in February 2001, one month before QE was 
                                                                                                                                           
era of regular GDP statistics) or stable economic growth (Japan’s post-crisis economic 
underperformance has lasted for the better part of two decades). Effectiveness of Quantitative Easing in Japan 
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reported to have been introduced by their employer. They define QE as an expansion 
in bank reserves and/or increased open market purchases. BoJ staff, Kimura et al. 
(2002) and Shirakawa (2002), chose the same definition of QE, which is also in line 
with the set of policies adopted by the BoJ in March 2001. While the goal of central 
bank policy is described as including the stimulation of the economy (nominal GDP), 
with the implied intermediary goal of stimulating bank lending, these authors, like 
others, measure the effectiveness of this ‘QE’ policy by the impact it had on interest 
rates. They conclude that one year after introduction, QE was not effective. Unlike 
studies on the effectiveness of other aspects of central bank policy (such as studies on 
the effectiveness of FX intervention policy, see e.g. Beine et al., 2009) they do not 
define effectiveness in terms of a final policy goal.   
 
A number of other papers argue that the low-interest rate environment constitutes a 
structural break from earlier periods. Blinder (2000), Bernanke (2000), Clouse et al. 
(2003), and Bernanke et al. (2004) are sceptical of the above models and discuss the 
tools and policy options available to central banks as nominal interest rates approach 
zero. They define QE as an increase of the size of the central bank’s balance sheet, 
and distinguish it from changes in the composition of the latter (by increasing the 
holdings of long-term government bonds). Their empirical work also measures policy 
effectiveness by the success in lowering long-term interest rates, and finds negative 
results in the case of Japan. Okina and Shiratsuka (2004), BoJ employees, define QE 
as the ‘abundant provision of funds’ by the central bank. They also assume that 
monetary policy effectiveness can primarily be measured in its success in influencing 
(short-term and) long-term interest rates, and that the transmission mechanism is the   8
formation of expectations due to a commitment to such a policy. Analysing yield 
curves, and spot and forward rates, they conclude that QE was ineffective. They 
conjecture that this was due to the policy’s inability to dispel deflationary 
expectations, as long-term yields remained low (‘indicating financial-market 
expectations that deflation will persist’). This is of interest, since it highlights one of 
the shortcomings of defining the ‘effectiveness’ of a policy tool in terms of input 
performance, depending on the central bank’s interpretation: The Bank of England 
has by contrast (and somewhat more convincingly) argued that low bond yields are a 
reflection of successful QE, as the bond purchase operations are said to be the reason 
for lower long-term interest rates (see, for instance, Miles, 2009).   
 
BoJ staff, Oda and Ueda (2005), also focus on the impact of QE on long-term interest 
rates. They find that QE has reduced medium- to long-term interest rates, and that 
there is no significant ‘portfolio balancing’ effect of asset purchases. Kimura and 
Small (2006, from the BoJ and the Fed, respectively) find some positive, though 
mixed results of ‘portfolio rebalancing’ due to BoJ asset purchases, which reduced 
risk premiums on assets such as government bonds, although they argue it may have 
increased risk premiums on equities and low-grade bonds. Ugai (2006, BoJ) surveys 
empirical studies and concludes that findings are mixed, with the largest effect of QE 
found in form of their impact on expected future short-term interest rates. 
 
Only Kobayashi et al. (2006) seems to adopt a different methodology. They argue, 
more in line with your argument, that “one of the primary motivations offered by the 
BoJ for its quantitative easing program… was to maintain credit extension by the Effectiveness of Quantitative Easing in Japan 
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troubled financial sector”. Although actual bank credit growth could be used as a 
measure of the central bank’s performance, they examine bank equity values. They 
find that excess returns were larger when the BoJ increased its long-term government 
bond purchases, and that the markets perceived that this policy disproportionately 
helped weaker banks. In this sense, they find QE to have had some effect – even if not 
fulfilling its ‘primary motivation’ (bank credit growth has largely remained negative 
in the years since 2001). 
2.1    Gaps in the literature and contribution of this paper 
The majority of the papers on the effectiveness of QE in Japan share a number of 
weaknesses, in addition to their largely inconclusive results: 
 
(a)  Excessive focus on input performance, while neglecting the measurement of 
output performance – the effectiveness in achieving final policy goals, as 
discussed above. 
 
(b)  Assumptions: The literature is based on models of financial markets and the 
economy that make result-critical assumptions largely at odds with empirical 
reality (no friction or financial constraints, rational expectations and perfect 
information). Assuming perfect markets is not likely to be useful when 
boom/bust cycles and banking crises are observable (as criticised by 
Bernanke et al., 2004 and Miles, 2009). There is considerable empirical 
evidence that banks are ‘special’ (e.g. Fama, 1985, Ashcraft, 2005), yet the 
literature on QE fails to incorporate banks in models that afford them special   10
features not offered by non-bank financial intermediaries. The reliance on 
expectations as the sole transmission mechanism also raises a number of 
analytical problems. 4   It precludes the possibility of a direct, more 
mechanical transmission of monetary policy, as is frequently called for (e.g. 
Bernanke et al., 2004, Miles, 2009, Werner, 1997).5  
 
(c)  The role of interest rates: The literature does not empirically estimate the 
actual relationship of monetary policy instruments and interest rates with 
final policy targets (such as nominal GDP). Were nominal interest rates not 
in the assumed negative and causal relationship with nominal GDP growth, 
as Blanchard (1986) and Bernanke and Gertler (1995) indicate, 6 the 
measurement of the effectiveness of QE by quantification of their impact on 
interest rates would be invalid. 
 
(d)  None of the literature considers the origins of the expression ‘quantitative 
easing’, which was coined in the 1990s by critics of the BoJ and referred to 
an expansion in broad credit creation (as opposed to reserve or high powered 
money expansion; see Werner, 1995).   
 
                                                           
4  This strand of literature suffers from and at times concedes the time inconsistency problem identified by 
Kydland and Prescott (1977), which renders monetary policy ineffective. 
5 Bernanke et al. (2004) have pointed out that the assumptions of frictionless financial markets and 
complete separation of monetary and fiscal policies which characterise this literature “to be sure, are 
rather strong. If these assumptions do not hold, we may have some basis for believing that quantitative 
easing will be effective. ” (p. 18). While remaining “agnostic about the precise mechanisms by which 
quantitative easing may have its effect” Bernanke et al. point to “the undeniable fact that, historically, 
money growth and inflation have tended to be strongly associated. It follows, according to this 
argument, that money creation will raise prices independent of its effects on the term structure” (p. 18). 
6  However, see also Mojon et al. (2002) for contrary evidence from Europe. Effectiveness of Quantitative Easing in Japan 
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(e)  The literature on the effectiveness of QE fails to integrate the growing body 
of literature on the ‘credit view’ of monetary policy transmission, which 
indicates that the bank lending channel is important (see, for instance, 
Bernanke and Gertler, 1995; Kakes and Sturm, 2002; Huang, 2003; but also 
earlier work such as VanHoose, 1983) or other evidence on aspects of the 
transmission mechanism (see, e.g. Andries and Billon, 2010). 
 
(f)  Assumed structural breaks: the literature often assumes but rarely tests for a 
structural break in the era of near-zero interest rates. This is, due to the 
limited data availability, likely also true for the otherwise convincing 
statement that “Standard economic models are of limited use in these 
unusual circumstances…” (Bank of England, 2009b). The admission of a 
structural break suggests that the models employed are not sufficiently 
robust to allow for diverse circumstances. Should more robust models 
without structural break be found, they would be preferable. 
 
This paper aims to address the above shortcomings and gaps in the literature by 
employing a different empirical methodology, which does not require untested 
assumptions about the functioning of the economy, or the operation of intermediate 
tools, and which tests for both ‘input’ and ‘output performance’. The question of the 
efficacy of policy tools is addressed by conducting a ‘horse race’ between different 
potential monetary policy tools or intermediary targets. This allows for the operation 
of different types of monetary policy transmission than assumed in the QE literature, 
especially via the credit channel.   12
3  Empirical  work 
Whether the BoJ’s actions between 2001 and 2006 were effective, or even whether 
the central bank actually did “discard the orthodox operating framework” (Kimura, 
2002) in 2001 are empirical questions that can be investigated.   
3.1 Methodology 
In order to implement the principle of ‘Revealed Preference’ (Samuelson, 1938), in 
this paper we step back from announcements by central banks (‘what they say’) and 
instead examine which of a list of potential policy tools and intermediary targets can 
empirically be shown to have been more relevant (‘what they do’).   
 
We thus compare a list of potential CB tools and instruments (including different 
interpretations of what could be meant with ‘quantitative easing’) with a generally 
accepted final target variable for monetary policy. No doubts about what this goal 
should be exist, when it comes to the aims of the central bank’s constituents (the 
government, businesses and the general public): their main interest is nominal GDP 
growth, as wages, revenues and profits are in nominal terms. The greater relevance of 
nominal GDP as the final policy target variable, and the measure by which to evaluate 
central bank performance, is especially obvious in the era of low or declining 
inflationary pressures. With deflation, real growth may be recorded while nominal 
growth is negative. Since corporate performance is not symmetric with respect to 
inflation and deflation (accounting is in nominal terms and firms are not able to Effectiveness of Quantitative Easing in Japan 
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accumulate losses indefinitely), deflation is accompanied by higher bankruptcies and 
unemployment than inflation.   
 
The above literature on QE in Japan also mentioned nominal GDP growth as one of 
the aims of central bank policy. So do several of the Bank of England’s publications 
on the “ultimate” objective of QE. There are other reasons why the final target 
variable should be nominal GDP growth. The literature on central bank performance 
has identified price stability, maximum economic growth, and stable currencies as the 
three key outputs of monetary policy.7 For our purposes, currencies are not of 
primary interest. Meanwhile, prices and output can be examined in one combined 
target variable, nominal GDP, without the need of separating the two. Finally, a 
significant number of macroeconomists from various persuasions agree (unusually in 
this profession) that a nominal GDP growth target more readily reflects the objectives 
of governments and economic agents (Tobin, 1980, Bean, 1983, Meade, 1984, 
Gordon, 1985, Hall, 1985, Taylor, 1985, McCallum, 1997, McCallum and Edward, 
1999, Frankel, 1995). Akram and Eitrheim (2008) find that output stabilization also 
enhances  financial  stability.    
 
                                                           
7  Hasan and Mester (2008, p. 6) state: “…while the tasks assigned to particular central banks have changed 
over the years, their key focus remains macroeconomic stability, including stable prices (low inflation), 
stable exchange rates (in some countries), and fostering of maximum sustainable growth (which may or 
may not be explicitly listed as a goal of the central bank in enabling legislation). See, e.g., Tuladhar (2005), 
Siebert (2003), Lybek (2002), McNamara (2002), and Healey (2001), Amtenbrink (1999), Maier (2007), 
and Caprio and Vittas (1995).” Not everyone shares the focus on maximum growth. Cecchetti and Krause 
(2002) define central bank performance as a weighted average of output and inflation variability, and in the 
process rating the Japanese central bank’s performance highly: it delivered output and inflation outcomes 
with little variability – unfortunately at unusually low or negative levels. Poloz (2006) also discusses 
central bank performance in terms of stability, and the lessons for their choice of goal.   14
We will attempt to establish empirically, based on historical relationships, which 
policy tools and instruments are more likely to be useful in influencing nominal GDP 
growth.  
 
An attractive empirical methodology for this purpose is the general-to-specific model 
selection methodology (the ‘London School of Economics methodology’, also known 
as the ‘Hendry method’), which allows competing monetary policy tools, 
intermediary instruments and differing interpretations of ‘quantitative easing’ to be 
equally represented in the first general model, whose features and statistical 
characteristics can also be tested (see Campos et al. 2005). Then, an objective 
sequential procedure of downward reduction to the parsimonious form is adopted, 
which amounts to a horse-race between the contenders and enables us to assess the 
relative performance of the competing policy models.8  This empirical benchmark can 
then be compared with particular actions taken by central banks in order to assess 
their likely relevance or effectiveness.   
 
The following potential central bank policy instruments or intermediary targets have 
been cited in the literature on the Japanese experience since the 1990s: 
(a)  Price tool: interest rates. Since the mid-1980s the role of the overnight 
uncollateralised call rate has become the dominant interest rate tool (Fukui, 
1986).  
(b)  Quantity tool I: traditionally, monetarist theory emphasised ‘high powered 
money’ (aka monetary base), which consists of two components: notes and 
                                                           
8  Theoretical discussions about the usefulness of a particular tool may turn out to be futile if this tool is not 
significant as an explanatory variable of the target variables. Effectiveness of Quantitative Easing in Japan 
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coins in circulation and banks’ reserves held in their accounts with the 
central bank. There are theoretical reasons for considering notes and coins in 
circulation less as tools of active monetary policy, as the endogenous 
component is likely to be large or dominant (see Okina, 1993; Goodhart, 
1989). The more relevant variable is thus likely to be bank reserves, which 
is consistent with both the literature on QE and the BoJ’s announcement of 
19 March 2001. 
(c)  Quantity tool II: it has been argued by the literature that the central bank’s 
balance sheet may be considered a tool of quantitative monetary policy (e.g. 
Bernanke et al., 2004). Specifically, both literature and the BoJ’s 
announcement of 19 March 2001 emphasise the role of purchases of long-
term assets (government bonds) by the central bank. More recently, the 
Federal Reserve has purchased a wide variety of assets, which has resulted in 
a dramatic expansion in its balance sheet. This policy tool can be quantified 
by considering the growth of central bank assets, in addition to the: 
(d)  ‘Quality tool’: the role of the composition of the central bank’s balance sheet 
(what Buiter calls ‘qualitative easing’). Here the basic ratio of long-term 
central bank assets to total assets is tested. These are defined to include 
both government bonds and direct loans to legal entities. 
(e)  Intermediate target I: the money supply. In Japan the most widely watched 
traditional broad money supply aggregate is M2+CD. 
(f)  Intermediate target II: bank credit. There is a substantial body of literature, 
including the so-called ‘credit view’ that considers bank lending important 
and ‘special’ (Bernanke and Gertler, 1995). A further innovation in this   16
paper is the use of a more refined credit aggregate, namely bank credit to 
the real economy (excluding the sectors closely associated with non-GDP, 
financial transactions) which has been shown to be superior theoretically and 
empirically in accounting for nominal GDP (Werner, 1997).9 
 
The personae dramatis of the econometric analysis can thus be summarised in Table 
1, including their abbreviations in the econometric model. 
 
 
Table 1:    Variables in the Empirical Model 
 
Policy instrument or 
intermediary target 
 
Relevant variable in Japan Abbreviation  in   
econometric model 
Interest rates 
 
ODR or o/n u/c call rate  Call 
Bank reserves 
 
Reserves Res 
Asset purchases 
 
BoJ B/S  Total Assets 
‘Qualitative 
easing’/balance sheet 
composition 
Ratio of long-term assets 
of central bank B/S 
LTAR 
Money supply 
 
M2+CD M2+CD 
Bank credit to the ‘real 
economy’ 
Bank credit to all sectors 
except real estate, 
financial institutions and 
construction 
Cr 
 
2.2. Empirical Findings 
After stationarity tests have confirmed that all variables (except interest rates) are I(1) 
processes, year-on-year growth rates are calculated (except for interest rates) and the 
                                                           
9  The distinction between money used for asset transactions and the real economy has in various forms 
been called for by Fisher (1926), Keynes (1936), Friedman (1956) and reflected in recent empirical work Effectiveness of Quantitative Easing in Japan 
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general model with nominal GDP as dependent variable formulated. The independent 
variables are call rate (call), bank reserves (Res), the proportion of long-term assets on 
the CB balance sheet (BoJLTAR), BoJ total assets (BoJTA), money supply M2+CD 
and the measure of broad credit used for GDP transactions (Cr). The general model is 
shown below in Table 2 (Eq 1). Tests of the error normality properties of the model 
found no problems.   
 
 
Table  2:  The  General  Model 
 
EQ (1)   Modelling YoYNGDP by OLS 
The estimation sample is: 1984 (1) to 2008 (1) 
 
Coefficient Std.Error  t-value  t-prob  Part.R^2 
YoYNGDP_1  0.550700       0.1273 4.33  0.000  0.2319 
YoYNGDP_2  0.0414786       0.1431  0.290 0.773 0.0014 
YoYNGDP_3  0.106657       0.1375  0.776 0.441 0.0096 
YoYNGDP_4  -0.212991       0.1145 -1.86  0.068  0.0528 
Constant  1.25370        2.686  0.467  0.642  0.0035 
Call    0.304339       0.3581  0.850  0.399  0.0115 
Call_1   0.0690669       0.5046  0.137  0.892  0.0003 
Call_2   0.0823537       0.4865  0.169  0.866  0.0005 
Call_3   -0.457302       0.4726  -0.968  0.337  0.0149 
Call_4   0.147538       0.3131  0.471  0.639  0.0036 
YoYRes -0.00482798  0.00596  -0.810  0.421  0.0105 
YoYRes_1 -0.00456327  0.007507  -0.608  0.546  0.0059 
YoYRes_2  0.0152022     0.007690 1.98  0.053  0.0593 
YoYRes_3 -0.00464491  0.007835  -0.593  0.555  0.0056 
YoYRes_4 -6.96581e-005 0.00559  -0.0125  0.990  0.0000 
BOJLTAR  0.292561        3.005  0.0974  0.923  0.0002 
BOJLTAR_1  -0.356588        2.943  -0.121  0.904  0.0002 
BOJLTAR_2  1.18909        2.922  0.407  0.685  0.0027 
BOJLTAR_3  1.31038        2.801  0.468  0.642  0.0035 
BOJLTAR_4  -3.66124        2.863  -1.28  0.206  0.0257 
YoY  BoJTA  -0.0149838      0.01597  -0.939  0.352  0.0140 
YoY  BoJTA_1   0.0146504      0.01631  0.898  0.373  0.0128 
YoY  BoJTA_2  0.0147589      0.01617  0.913  0.365  0.0133 
YoY  BoJTA_3  -0.0305062      0.01581  -1.93  0.058  0.0567 
YoY  BoJTA_4  0.00829787      0.01604  0.517  0.607  0.0043 
YoYM2+CD  -0.254060       0.2179  -1.17  0.248  0.0215 
YoYM2+CD_1  0.515606       0.3743  1.38  0.173  0.0297 
YoYM2+CD_2  -0.376703       0.4118  -0.915  0.364  0.0133 
YoYM2+CD_3  0.123713       0.3970  0.312  0.756  0.0016 
YoYM2+CD_4  0.0342873       0.2346  0.146  0.884  0.0003 
YoYCr    0.511693       0.1646  3.11  0.003  0.1348 
YoYCr_1  -0.239732       0.1875  1.28  0.206  0.0257 
YoYCr_2  -0.249947       0.1994  -1.25  0.215  0.0247 
YoYCr_3  0.301781       0.1743  1.73  0.088  0.0461 
                                                                                                                                           
(e.g. Büyükkarabacak and Krause, 2009; Büyükkarabacak and Valev, 2010; Drake and Fleissig, 2010).   18
YoYCr_4 -0.0745332  0.1874  -0.398  0.692  0.0025 
 
sigma   1.20633   RSS   90.2244824 
R^2   0.911775   F(34,62)  =   18.85  [0.000]** 
log-likelihood  -134.125   DW   2.03 
no. of obs.  97        no. of parameters  35 
mean(YoYNGDP)2.53633   var(YoYNGDP)  10.5429 
 
AR 1-5 test:  F(5,57)  =  2.0781  [0.0814]     
ARCH 1-4 test:  F(4,54)  =  0.39342  [0.8125]     
Normality  test:  Chi^2(2)  =  3.6188  [0.1638]   
hetero  test:  Chi^2(68) =  69.545  [0.4252]   
RESET  test:  F(1,61)  =  0.013157 [0.9091]   
 
Next, the ‘gets’ methodology is applied and this general model is reduced to its 
parsimonious form by sequentially dropping the most insignificant coefficient and 
then re-estimating the new model, until all coefficients are significant at the 5% level. 
Additionally, the downward reduction is checked for validity using F-tests and linear 
restriction tests (the progress report in PcGive). As a cut-off for the validity of 
reduction progress, the 1% level was chosen. The result is the following parsimonious 
form (Table 3): 
 
Table  3:    The  Parsimonious  Model 
 
EQ(32)    Modelling YoYNGDP by OLS   
The estimation sample is: 1984 (1) to 2008 (1) 
 
Coefficient    Std.Error  t-value  t-prob  Part.R^2 
YoYNGDP_1 0.620707    0.07803  7.95  0.000   0.4075 
YoYNGDP_4 -0.113130    0.06514  -1.74  0.086   0.0317 
Constant  0.517173   0.1819  2.84  0.005   0.0808 
YoYRes_2  0.00688439  0.002782 2.48  0.015   0.0624 
YoYCr    0.364538   0.05785  6.30  0.000   0.3015 
 
sigma   1.19896     RSS    132.250598 
R^2    0.870681    F(4,92)  =   154.9  [0.000]** 
log-likelihood  -152.671    DW    2.16 
no.  of  obs.  97           no.  of  parameters  5 
mean(YoYNGDP)2.53633   var(YoYNGDP)  10.5429 
 
AR 1-5 test:  F(5,87)  =  1.8064  [0.1199]     
ARCH 1-4 test:  F(4,84)  =  0.80851  [0.5232]     
Normality  test:  Chi^2(2)  =  5.3159  [0.0701]   
hetero  test:  F(8,83)  =  0.71401  [0.6785]   
hetero-X  test:  F(14,77)  =  1.3420  [0.2033]   
RESET  test:  F(1,91)  =  2.4094  [0.1241]   
 
 
Analysis of lag structure, coefficients: Effectiveness of Quantitative Easing in Japan 
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              Lag  0      Lag  1  Lag  2  Lag  3  Lag  4  Sum  SE(Sum) 
YoYNGDP     -1  0.621  0  0  -0.113  -0.492  0.0759 
Constant 0.517  0 0 0 0 0.517  0.182 
YoYRes 0 0 0.00688  0 0 0.00688  0.00278 
YoYCr    0.365  0 0 0 0 0.365  0.0579 
 
Tests on the significance of each variable 
Variable       F-test    Value  [  Prob]     Unit-root  t-test 
YoYNGDP      F(2,92)  =  33.764  [0.0000]**        -6.4894** 
Constant       F(1,92)  =  8.0862  [0.0055]** 
YoYRes        F(1,92)  =  6.1258  [0.0152]*           2.475 
YoYCr         F(1,92)  =  39.706  [0.0000]**         6.3012 
 
Tests on the significance of each lag 
Lag  1        F(1,92)  =   63.273  [0.0000]** 
Lag  2        F(1,92)  =   6.1258  [0.0152]*  
Lag  4        F(1,92)  =   3.0167  [0.0858]   
 
 
The parsimonious model has no noticeable problems and appears to be a valid 
empirical model of nominal GDP growth. Figure 1 shows the actual and fitted curves 
for nominal GDP growth. 
 
 
Figure 1: Nominal GDP, Actual and Fitted, Error terms 
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Granger-causality tests show that there is evidence for unidirectional ‘causality’ from 
credit variable Cr to nominal GDP, and not in the other direction (Table 4).   20
 
 
Table 4:    Granger ‘causality’ tests: Autoregressive Distributed Lag Model 
 
 
Finally, structural break tests are conducted, to examine whether there were any 
breaks in the relationship between nominal GDP and monetary variables. This was 
done with the general model, in order to capture any structural breaks within any of 
the potential explanatory variables. 
 
First, the recursive graphical tests are shown in Figure 1. As can be seen, there is no 
indication that a structural break occurred in 2001 or 2006, when ‘quantitative easing’ 
was said to have been adopted. 
 
 
Figure 2:    Recursive Structural Break Tests 
Test on the significance of 
independent variable 
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Dynamic Analysis:   
 
F(5,86)  =  3.6510  [0.0048]**  F(5,86)  =  0.23255  [0.9473] 
Linear Restriction Test 
 
F(1,86) = 10.1243 [0.0020] **  F(1,86) = 0.00355254 [0.9526] Effectiveness of Quantitative Easing in Japan 
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The data output shows that 1-step Chow tests found evidence for a structural break 
only in 1988 Q1 and Q2, 1991 Q1, 1993 Q2, and 2004 Q1 (all at the 5% level, with 
the sole exception of 1988 Q2), but in no other quarter. The data output of the 
breakpoint Chow test found evidence of structural break in the 1987 Q2 to 1988 Q2 
period (5% level), but in no other period. We proceed to specifically test the 
hypothesis that a structural break occurred in 2001(1) by dividing the sample into two 
periods, from 1984 (1) to 2001 (1) and from 2001 (2) to 2008 (1) and test whether it is 
permissible to pool them into the full length sample. This is done with the Chow 
Breakpoint test. The F statistic is F(20,57) = 0.9848. The critical value is 1.757. We 
fail to reject the null hypothesis of parameter stability. 
 
A more precise test of whether the relationship between nominal GDP and its 
explanatory variables changed in the period of 2001 Q2 and 2006 Q2, when the BoJ is 
said to have implemented QE, can be conducted by the inclusion of a dummy variable.   22
We do this firstly by including the dummy in the parsimonious form, and secondly, in 
the general model followed by the downward reduction. In both cases, the dummy 
was not significant. The model with dummy showed some normality problem and the 
F-test for exclusion of the dummy indicated that it can be dropped. The final form, 
identical with the above, did not have normality problems (see Table 5 for the former 
case). 
 
Table 5:    Dummy Variable for QE (2001 Q2 to 2006 Q2) 
 
EQ(33)    Modelling YoYNGDP by OLS   
The estimation sample is: 1984 (1) to 2008 (1) 
 
Coefficient    Std.Error  t-value  t-prob  Part.R^2 
YoYNGDP_1 0.624518    0.07845  7.96  0.000   0.4105 
YoYNGDP_4 -0.108985    0.06579  -1.66  0.101   0.0293 
Constant  0.496360   0.2077  2.39  0.019   0.0590 
YoYRes_2  0.00610657  0.003112 1.96  0.053   0.0406 
YoYCr    0.354955   0.06039  5.88  0.000   0.2752 
Dummy  0.104820   0.3991  0.263  0.793   0.0008 
 
sigma   1.20884     RSS    132.977134 
R^2    0.869492    F(5,91)  =   121.3  [0.000]** 
log-likelihood  -152.937    DW    2.18 
no.  of  obs.  97           no.  of  parameters  6 
mean(YoYNGDP)2.6171   var(YoYNGDP)  10.5043 
 
AR 1-5 test:    F(5,86)  =  1.6045  [0.1675]     
ARCH 1-4 test:    F(4,83)  =  0.76419  [0.5515]     
Normality test:    Chi^2(2)  =  6.0946  [0.0475]*   
hetero  test:    F(9,81)  =  0.65815  [0.7439]   
hetero-X  test:    F(19,71)  =  1.1106  [0.3599]   
RESET  test:    F(1,90)  =  2.2435  [0.1377]   
 
Test for excluding: Dummy 
Subset F(1,87) = 0.101898 [0.7503] 
 
 
We conclude that no statistical evidence of a significant change in the relationship 
between potential monetary policy tools or intermediary targets and nominal GDP 
could be found. The announcement of changes in the operating procedure by the BoJ 
did not make a difference to the implementation of monetary policy.   Effectiveness of Quantitative Easing in Japan 
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4  Conclusions 
The results suggest that the research strategy of measuring the effectiveness of QE by 
the perceived impact on nominal interest rates or the term structure – as has been 
dominant in the literature – may not be fruitful. The findings also differ from much of 
the literature in that there appears to be a stable relationship between nominal GDP 
growth and a broad money aggregate – albeit its modified credit counterpart, in line 
with earlier findings (Werner, 1997). This has important implications for monetary 
policy conduct, as the apparent breakdown of a stable relationship between monetary 
aggregates and nominal GDP (the ‘velocity decline’) led to much uncertainty among 
theorists and practitioners. 
 
Until 2001, the Japanese central bank had stated that “the operating target for money 
market operations is the uncollateralised overnight call rate” (BoJ, 2001). On 19 
March 2001 we were told the CB had decided “to finally discard the orthodox 
operating framework and adopt a new framework” (Kimura, 2002, p. 4). But there is 
no evidence that the operating instrument of monetary policy had, in fact, been the 
call interest rate until 2001: as interest rates are not significant in explaining economic 
activity, a rational central bank would not target them. For all we know, the BoJ may 
have always focused on bank credit creation, supported by a suitable provision of 
bank reserves, as our empirical model suggests. 
 
In summary, findings are: 
(a)  Until the financial crisis of 2008, the ‘new consensus’ of monetary policy 
implementation had been the use of nominal short-term interest rates   24
(Woodford, 2003; call rates in the Japanese case). However, interest rates 
dropped out from the model in the sequential downward reduction.   
(b)  One of the more orthodox intermediary targets, bank credit growth, appears 
to be in a stable long-term relationship with nominal GDP growth.10 The 
innovations made in the definition of the monetary aggregate are the use of 
the credit counterparts, and the disaggregation, so that only credit for 
transactions that are part of GDP is used. Lack of such disaggregation has 
been argued to explain the apparent ‘velocity decline’ (Werner, 1997). This 
raises the prospect of a revival of a more traditional, quantity-based approach 
(monetarism modified by the use of disaggregated credit counterparts). 
(c)  The BoJ’s announcement of 19 March 2001 claimed that a break with prior 
policy was made and reserves were newly emphasised. However, there is no 
evidence that monetary policy changed from March 2001 to March 2006. 
The empirical model derived through the ‘gets’ methodology found that 
reserves have been the only other of two successful explanatory variables 
throughout the 1984 to 2008 observation period; and therefore, if one ignores 
the PR aspect of the post-March 2001 announcements, the use of reserves 
would not appear to be a new or unorthodox strategy.   
(d)  While some studies claimed to have found support for a significant impact of 
the ‘qualitative easing’ strategy of changing a central bank’s balance sheet 
composition (by increasing long-term holdings of assets), this particular 
indicator dropped out from the model. 
                                                           
10 This finding supports the results reported by Akram and Eitrheim (2008) that stabilization of credit 
growth enhances stability in both inflation and output. Effectiveness of Quantitative Easing in Japan 
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(e)  Total central bank asset growth was not found to be empirically relevant as a 
potential explanatory variable of nominal GDP growth.   
(f)  Finally, given the importance of credit for GDP transactions in affecting 
economic growth, all methods that may influence this particular variable 
need to be considered. Werner (1995) makes suggestions, including the 
substitution of bond issuance with government borrowing from banks. This 
would boost credit creation which, ironically, was the original meaning of 
the term ‘quantitative easing’. Another, more controversial method would be 
the re-introduction of a regime of credit controls (‘window guidance’), or at 
least a re-appraisal of the techniques of rediscounting (Langohr and 
Santomero, 1985). Alas, such policies were not adopted and nominal GDP 
growth remained sub-optimal, as had been warned (Werner, 1995). 
(g)  Concerning central bank performance, we conclude that it was possible for 
the Bank of Japan to boost nominal GDP growth during the 1990s and 2000s, 
via policies that affect bank credit creation. Central bank performance is 
therefore found to have been unsatisfactory. 
(h)  The Japanese experience may hold lessons for countries affected by the 
2007/8 financial crisis. Policies aimed at stimulating bank credit growth are 
likely to be crucial in order to achieve an economic recovery.   
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